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A Forgotten Clause of the Constitution: The Contract Clause In Light of Sveen v. Melin
Robert Jenkin*
I.

Introduction
Mark Sveen and Kaye Melin fell in love in the 1990’s and in 1997 the couple married.1 One

year later, Mr. Sveen purchased a life insurance policy naming his wife as the primary beneficiary.2
In 2002, Minnesota, where the Sveen’s resided, enacted statute 524.2-804 requiring the default
revocation of previous spouses named as beneficiaries after divorces except in certain
circumstances.3 Unfortunately, the Sveen’s marriage did not last and in 2007 the couple divorced
without any mention of the life insurance policy.4 Mr. Sveen passed away just four years later
having not altered his life insurance policy and creating a mystery of who he intended the Life
insurance policy to benefit.5
A federal district court ruled that the statute required Mr. Sveen’s life insurance policy payout
be paid to the contingent beneficiaries, his two children.6 The United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit, reversed and remanded the district court decision, holding that the statute was
unconstitutional when applied retroactively because it violated the Contract Clause of the United
States Constitution.7 The Supreme Court issued a Writ of Certiorari in the case and reversed the
decision of the Court of Appeals, holding that the statute’s retroactive applicability does not violate
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1
Sveen v. Melin, 138 S.Ct. 1815, 1821 (2018).
2
Melin, 138 S.Ct. at 1821.
3
Id. at 1820; Minn. Stat. Ann. § 524.2-804 (“[T]he dissolution or annulment of a marriage revokes any revocable . . .
disposition, beneficiary designation, or appointment of property made by an individual to the individual’s former
spouse in a governing instrument.”).
4
Sveen v. Melin, 138 S. Ct. 1815, 1821 (2018).
5
Melin, 138 S.Ct. at 1821.
6
Id.
7
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Melin, 853 F.3d 410, 414 (8th Cir. 2017).

the Contract Clause of the Constitution because it did not substantially impair the insurance
contract.8 Justice Neil Gorsuch filed a lone dissent in the case.9 The Court’s holding in Sveen was
just the newest installment of a two century-long debate on the proper interpretation of the Contract
Clause.
This Comment will examine the Supreme Court’s long history of interpreting and applying the
Contract Clause of the Constitution in Part II; the interpretation of the Contract Clause used by the
Court in Sveen to reach its holding in Part III; the alternative interpretation of the Contract Clause
applied by Justice Gorsuch in his dissent in Part IV; the problems inherent in the Court’s
interpretation of the Contract Clause in Part V; propose a new interpretation of the Contract Clause
that is more aligned with its original purpose and intent in Part VI; examine the arguments against
the proposed interpretation in Part VII; and, will hypothesize how Sveen would have turned out
differently under the proposed interpretation in Part VIII.
II.

Contract Clause Jurisprudence, From the Framers to the Present
A. The Early History of the Contract Clause
While the Contract Clause of the Constitution is only eleven words in total length, hundreds

of thousands of words have been written interpreting it.10 The Contract Clause is found in Article
I, Section 10, Clause 1, which in its entirety states, “[n]o State shall enter into any treaty, alliance,
or confederation; grant letters of marque and reprisal; coin money; emit bills of credit; make
anything but gold and silver a legal tender in payment of debts; pass any bill of attainder, ex-postfacto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts; or grant any title of nobility.”11 The

8

Sveen v. Melin, 138 S.Ct. 1815, 1826 (2018).
Melin, 138 S.Ct. at 1827 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
10
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
11
Id.
9

2

Contract Clause itself only refers to the prohibition against states passing laws that impair “the
obligation of contracts.”12
The Contract Clause was introduced at the Constitutional Convention by Rufus King and was
molded after an Ordinance in the Articles of Confederation.13 When it was introduced, the clause
was not loved by all.14 Multiple objections over its inclusion were made during the ratifying
process.15 The history of the debate over the Contract Clause gives insight into what the original
purpose of the Clause was.16 The Contract Clause was intended to protect contracts from
protectionist legislation passed by states.17 Its purpose was also to protect minorities from
majority’s laws, as well as to promote stability.18 One objection made at the time of the ratification
was that the Contract Clause prevented states from responding with necessary regulations in times
of emergency.19 Even James Madison, who supported the Contract Clause’s inclusion, admitted
that it could act as an inconvenience for the states, but felt the clause was necessary.20
While there is some dispute over the exact purpose of the Contract Clause, many scholars
reference Federalist Paper 44 for guidance.21 Written by Madison, the paper argued that,
The sober people of America are weary of the fluctuating policy which has directed
the public councils. They have seen with regret and indignation that sudden
12

Id.
See Douglas W. Kmiec & John O. McGinnis, The Contract Clause: A Return to the Original Understanding, 14
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 525, 529–30 (1987) [hereinafter Original Understanding] (citing to the Ordinance for the
Government of the Territory of the United States North-West of the River Ohio, 1 Stat. 51 (1789)).
14
Id. at 530.
15
Id. at 531.
16
Id. at 532–33.
17
Id.
18
See Original Understandings, supra note 13, at 528–29.
19
Id. at 533 (Martin Luther complained the Contract Clause would limit the abilities of states to pass legislation during
emergencies.).
20
Id. at 530.
21
See J. Michael Veron, The Contract Clause and the Court: A View of Precedent and Practice in Constitutional
Adjudication, 54 TUL. L. REV. 117, 122–23 (1979) [hereinafter, Contract Clause and the Court] (arguing that there is
some doubt about the origin of the Contract Clause and referencing Federalist No. 44 as guidance on the purpose of
the Contract Clause); see also Tommy Tobin, Far From A” Dead Letter”: The Contract Clause and North Carolina
Association of Educators v. State, 96 N.C.L. REV. 1681, 1682 [hereinafter, Far from a “Dead Letter”] (arguing that
the Contract Clause was passed directly in response to the needs of the time as described in The Federalist No. 44).
13
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changes and legislative interferences, in cases affecting personal rights, become
jobs in the hands of enterprising and influential speculators, and snares to the moreindustrious and less informed part of the community.22
The paper demonstrated that contracts were understood to be important at the time the Constitution
was ratified and supports the argument that the goal of the Contract Clause was to protect contracts
from “sudden changes and legislative interferences” especially in cases “affecting personal
rights”.23 The early jurisprudence of the Contract Clause aligned with this understanding of the
purpose of the Contract Clause.24
In 1810, the Supreme Court heard Fletcher v. Peck, a Contract Clause challenge to the repeal
of a law selling land in the State of Georgia.25 The crux of the case was that Georgia repealed a
law under which land rights were sold to citizens.26 One of the questions before the Court was
could the State absolve itself of the contracts it had entered into to distribute the land under the
law.27 The Court held that the repealing of the law violated the Constitution.28 The Court, without
mention of the Contract Clause, held the law impaired the land-granting contracts.29
This all-inclusive and broad interpretation of the Contract Clause was reaffirmed in the 1819
matter of Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward.30 The case involved the corporate charter
of Dartmouth College and a New Hampshire law that attempted to alter the charter to make the
college a public university.31 The Court held the New Hampshire law was an impairment to the

22

THE FEDERALIST NO. 44 (James Madison); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaidell, 290 U.S. 398, 463 (Sutherland,
J. dissenting) (1934).
23
Id.
24
See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 88 (1810); Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 663 (1819);
Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. 122 (1819); Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. 1 (1823).
25
10 U.S. 87, 127 (1810).
26
Id. at 129.
27
Id. at 130.
28
Id. at 132.
29
Id. at 132, 139 (the Court also compared to the impairment to a violation of ex-post-facto law, which is prohibited
by the Constitution in the same clause as the Contract Clause); See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
30
17 U.S. 518 (1819).
31
Id. at 624–27.
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charter and was therefore unconstitutional.32 In the Court’s holding, Justice Marshall opined,
“[a]nd can it be seriously contended, that a law, which changes so materially the terms of a
contract, does not impair it?

In short, does not every alteration of a contract, however,

unimportant, even though it be manifestly for the interest of the party objecting to it, impair its
obligation?”33
The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Contract Clause in Woodward was reaffirmed twice
before it was amended by the Court.34 In Sturges v. Crowninshield, a bankruptcy law was held
unconstitutional when applied retroactively.35 In Green v. Biddle, the Supreme Court held that “a
State has no more power to impair an obligation into which she has entered” and struck down a
Kentucky law that altered a contract between the states of Kentucky and Virginia.36
After Green, the next time the Supreme Court heard a Contract Clause dispute was in Ogden
v. Saunders, which presented a challenge to New York’s bankruptcy law.37 The Court held that
the Contract Clause only prevented states from passing laws that retroactively impaired
contracts.38 The Court supported its holding by arguing that the Contract Clause must be
interpreted in the same fashion as the other prohibitions found in Article 1, Section 10, Clause 1
of the Constitution.39 In conclusion of it holding, the Court stated “the prohibition, in the tenth
section, reaches to all contracts.”40 The Court’s holding in Saunders marked the beginning of a

32

Id. at 650.
Id. at 662.
34
Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. 1 (1823).
35
Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. 122, 123, 131 (1819).
36
Crowninshield, 17 U.S. at 92–93.
37
25 U.S. 213, 254 (1827).
38
Saunders, 25 U.S. at 252; see Contract Clause and the Court, supra note 21, at 126.
39
Id.; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. (Prohibits states from paying their debts with anything other than silver or gold
or coining their own money).
40
Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. 213, 254 (1827).
33
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downhill spiral for the Contract Clause by limiting the Contract Clause to a ban against retroactive
state legislation that impaired contracts.41
Considered together, the Court’s holdings in Fletcher, Woodward, Sturges, Green and
Saunders laid out a clear and definitive interpretation of the Contract Clause—an interpretation
that acted as a bar against any state law that sought to retroactively impair contracts between any
parties, for any reason, and that did not distinguish between private and public contracts.42 This
complete bar has never been seen again in Contract Clause jurisprudence.43
B. The First Decline of the Contract Clause
Post Saunders, the Supreme Court began weakening the Contract Clause.44 In 1870, in the
case of Jackson ex dem. Hart v. Lamphire, the Supreme Court held that retroactive recording laws
did not violate the Contract Clause.45 Additionally, the Court held “Cases may occur where the
provisions [of a law] . . . may be so unreasonable as to amount to a denial of a right” of the contract
but that was not the case in the matter before it.46 Compared to Court’s holding Saunders, the
Court’s holding in Lamphire interpreted the Contract Clause to be less absolute.47
In the 1871 case of Curtis v. Whitney, the Supreme Court upheld a retroactive state law that
required the holder of a certificate of tax-sale to notify anyone in possession of the land listed on
the tax-sale certificate.48 The Court relied on its previous holding in Jackson to support its holding
41

See Contract Clause and the Court, supra note 21, at 126; Leo Clarke, The Contract Clause: A Basis For Limited
Judicial Review of State Economic Regulation, 39 U. MIAMI L. REV. 183, 190 (1985) [hereinafter, Limited Judicial
Review].
42
See Contract Clause and the Court, supra note 21, at 127; see also Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87 (1810); Trustees of
Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819); Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. 122 (1819); Green v. Biddle,
21 U.S. 1 (1823); Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. 213 (1827).
43
See Original Understanding, supra note 13, at 527.
44
See Limited Judicial Review, supra note 41, at 190 (describing how starting in 1842, the Contract Clause began
being weakened by the Court).
45
28 U.S. 280, 290 (1830).
46
Lamphire, 28 U.S. at 290.
47
Compare Jackson ex dem. Hart v. Lamphire, 28 U.S. 280 (1830) (where the Court upheld a state recording law)
with Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. 213 (1827) (where the Court struck down a state bankruptcy law).
48
80 U.S. 68, 70–72 (1871).
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in Curtis.49 Notably, the Curtis Court held that “[n]or does every statute which affects the value
of a contract impair its obligation.”50 The Court concluded that only state laws which impaired
the “obligation of performance” were restrained by the Constitution.51
Stone v. Mississippi was the next major Contract Clause case that made its way to the Supreme
Court.52 The case was a challenge to a Mississippi law that repealed a contract, in which the state
was a party, allowing a state lottery.53 The Court’s holding in Stone stands out because it
distinguished between public and private contracts.54 The Court held that the Contract Clause only
protected “property rights, not governmental” rights because the Court thought it was foreseeable
by those who chartered lottery corporations with the state that the state retained the ability to
legislate the lottery out of existence at any time.55 The consideration of the Court about the
foreseeability of government action in the field in which the contract exist is a theme that continues
in Contract Clause jurisprudence.56
In Vance v. Vance, the Supreme Court examined a Louisiana mortgage recording statute to
determine if it violated the Contract Clause.57 The Court upheld the law and reaffirmed its previous
holdings in Curtis and Jackson.58 The Court held the recording statute acted similarly to statutes
of limitations.59 The Court also held that both recording statutes and statutes of limitations were
necessary to manage land rights and that the laws did not impair the rights of contracts as they did

49

Whitney, 80 U.S. at 71.
Id. at 70.
51
Id. at 71.
52
101 U.S. 814 (1879).
53
Stone, 101 U.S. at 816.
54
Id.
55
Id. at 820.
56
Id.; see Sveen v. Melin, 138 S.Ct. 1815, 1822 (2018) (the Court considered the fact a Court could have altered the
life insurance policy when the Sveen’s divorced as evidence the contract was not impaired).
57
108 U.S. 514, 516 (1883).
58
Vance, 108 U.S. at 518, 520, 522.
59
Id. at 520.
50
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not “change, defeat, or impair the obligation” of contracts.60 The comparison of recording statutes
to statutes of limitations laws is an often repeated concept in Contract Clause jurisprudence.61 It
is similar to viewing state laws as default rules that act on, but do not impair contracts—a view
analyzed in the Court’s holding in Sveen.62
Not long after the Court’s holding in Vance, the Court heard the matter of Gilfillan v. Union
Canal Co. of Pennsylvania.63 In Gilfillan, the Court upheld a retroactive state law because the
impairment the law caused was held to be reasonable.64 The Court cited to Vance for the
proposition that the Court should examine the ease of compliance with the law as evidence of why
the law should stand.65 Balancing the reasonableness of the impairment to the contract and the
ease of compliance with the law continue to be elements of Contract Clause jurisprudence today.66
Seibert v. Lewis was the next major Contract Clause case to reach the Supreme Court and
demonstrated that the clause was not yet worthless.67 The Court in Seibert held that the Missouri
law impaired what it viewed as the most important portion of a contract—the ability to enforce it
—and was therefore unconstitutional.68

The holding in Seibert was important because it

recognized that impairment of contracts was still a concern for the Court and that Contract Clause
challenges were still worth bring.69
Similarly, in McGahey v. Commonwealth of Virginia, the Court demonstrated that the Contract
Clause was not completely dead letter law.70 The Court held in McGahey that a retroactive

60

Id. at 517.
Sveen v. Melin, 138 S.Ct. 1815, 1823–24 (2018).
62
Id.
63
109 U.S. 401 (1883).
64
Gilfillan, 109 U.S. at 406–07.
65
Id. at 407.
66
See Sveen v. Melin, 138 S.Ct. 1815, 1817–18 (2018).
67
122 U.S. 284 (1887).
68
Lewis, 122 U.S. at 297, 300.
69
Id. at 300.
70
135 U.S. 662 (1890).
61
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Virginia law that burdened the redemption of bonds was unconstitutional.71 The Court stated that
“[i]t is well settled by the adjudications of this court that the obligation of a contract is impaired,
in the sense of the constitution, by any act which prevents its enforcement, or which materially
abridges the remedy for enforcing it”.72
C. Rock Bottom for the Contract Clause
The entire application of the Contract Clause changed with the Court’s holding in Home
Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell in 1934.73 A Minnesota mortgage moratorium law was
challenged for violating the Contract Clause because the law allowed courts to prolong the time a
borrower had to recover when behind on their mortgage.74 It must be noted that this law was
passed in the heart of the Great Depression.75 The Court’s holding in Blaisdell set forth a test to
determine what level of impairment a state law can constitutionally create.76 The creation of the
test itself demonstrated how weakened the Contract Clause had become. The Contract Clause that
had once held that any impairment of a contract was unconstitutional, now had a test to determine
the amount of impairment that was permissible.77 The Court’s holding made clear it was no longer
bound by the original understanding of the Contract Clause.78
The test set forth in the Court’s holding considered five factors: (1) was the law passed in
pursuit of a reasonable end and written reasonably to accomplish that end, noting that a reasonable

71

Id. at 684.
Id. at 693.
73
290 U.S. 398 (1934); see Original Understanding, supra note 13 at 541–42; see Dead Letter, supra note 21, at
1686–87.
74
Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 415–16 (1934).
75
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 419.
76
Id. at 444–48.
77
Compare Home Building & Loan Assoc. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934) (Where the Court utilized a five factor
test to determine how much impairment was constitutional) with Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 88 (1810) (Where the
Court held any impairment was unconstitutional).
78
Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaidell, 290 U.S. 398, 439 (1934) (“It cannot be maintained that the constitutional
prohibition should be so construed as to prevent limited and temporary interpositions with respect to the enforcement
of contracts”).
72
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end cannot be to advantage certain individuals; (2) was the law passed in response to an
emergency; (3) was the law an appropriate response to the emergency; (4) are the impairments
created by the law reasonable in comparison to the emergency the law was drafted to address; and,
(5) was the law temporary in nature or was the law meant to exist even after the emergency
subsided.79 While this five-factor test is no longer the standard applied to state laws challenged
under the Contract Clause, it is still often cited and referenced as leading to the current standard.80
It should be noted that the Court’s holding in Blaisdell had a dissent, written by Justice
Sutherland, which took issue with the majority’s ignoring of the original meaning of the Contract
Clause.81 In the dissent, the justice made clear that considering public and private contracts
differently was a disturbing development and one that violated both the original intent of the
Contract Clause and the Contract Clause jurisprudence of the Court.82 These are complaints that
are levied at the Court today for its modern jurisprudence involving the Contract Clause.83
In City of El Paso v. Simmons, a 1965 Supreme Court Contract Clause challenge, the Court
referenced but did not wholly rely on the Court’s earlier holding in Blaisdell.84 In Simmons, the
Court held that a Texas law that retroactively placed a five-year statute of limitation on challenges
to land foreclosures by the state, on property sold by the state, was constitutional.85 The Court
held, in line with its earlier decisions, that not all modifications of contracts, nor alterations of
possible remedies, constituted unconstitutional impairment.86 The Court’s holding in Simmons

79

Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 444–48.
See United States Tr. Co. of New York v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977); see also Allied Structural Steel Co. v.
Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978).
81
Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaidell, 290 U.S. 398, 448–50 (Sutherland, J. dissenting) (1934).
82
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 454 (Sutherland, J. dissenting).
83
Sveen v. Melin, 138 S.Ct. 1815, 1827 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (2018).
84
379 U.S. 497, 508 (1965).
85
Simmons, 379 U.S. at 497–500, 517.
86
Id. at 508.
80
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exemplified the weakening of the Contract Clause to its most powerless form.87 The holding
showed that a state could retroactively change the terms of a contract, to which it was a party, in a
manner that led to the complete loss of property by the other party of the contract, without the law
running afoul of the Contract Clause.88
Justice Black wrote a dissent in Simmons that is often quoted by advocates for a return to the
original interpretation of the Contract Clause.89 In the dissent, the justice criticized what he defined
as the Court “balancing away the plain guarantee” of the Contract Clause.90 Justice Black was
critical of the rationale of the Majority, which he accused of setting the precedent that contracts
can be impaired by the states whenever it is financially advisable.91 He also took issue with the
Court “balancing” its way into upholding a law that it openly admitted was an impairment of
contracts.92 Justice Black cited to The Federalist Number 44, the Court’s holding in both Fletcher
and Sturges, and early Contract Clause jurisprudence as evidence that while remedies may be
altered by a state, the obligations of a contract never can be.93 Justice Black accused the majority
of having made up new law without the support of precedent and of having overruled the Court’s
Contract Clause precedent without acknowledging they did so.94
The dissent also disagreed with the Court’s interpretation of Blaisdell.95 Justice Black argued
that Blaisdell was limited to laws that retroactively impair contracts during times of urgent need.96
Lastly, the dissent took issue with the idea of a “reasonableness formula” which the justice defined

87

Compare City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497 (1965) with Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 88 (1810).
Sveen v. Melin, 138 S.Ct. 1815, 1828 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (2018).
89
City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 517 (Black, J. dissenting) (1965).
90
Simmons, 379 U.S. at 517 (Black, J. dissenting).
91
Id. at 518.
92
Id. at 520.
93
Id. at 522.
94
Id. at 523, 531–32 (“I do not believe that any or all of the things set out above on which the Court relies are . . .
required by the Contract Clause.”).
95
Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 523 (Black, J. dissenting) (“The cases the Court mentions do not supports its reasoning.”).
96
Id. at 529.
88
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as a test of “indefinable standards”.97 Justice Black quibbled with the concept that the Court should
attempt to define the “primary consideration” of why a buyer entered into a contract.98 While
Justice Black was alone in his dissent, his powerful argument fuels many critics of the modern
jurisprudence of the Contract Clause.99
D. The Contract Clause Returns from the Grave
In 1977, the Supreme Court heard a challenge to the revocation of a bond agreement between
the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey in the case of United States Trust Company of
New York v. New Jersey.100 The Court began by addressing the history of the Contract Clause,
pointing out that the Contract Clause was originally a very strong check on state powers but had
been weakened over time and become less frequently used after the passing of the Fourteenth
Amendment.101 The Court then addressed what it described as the two controlling cases of
Contract Clause jurisprudence, Blaisdell and Simmons.102 The Court pointed out that both holdings
set a very high bar for invalidating a state law.103 The Court held that while it may not “comport[]
with current views of wise public policy, the Contract Clause remains a part of our written
Constitution.”104 The Court’s holding was filled with dicta that can best be described as a battle
to balance the Contract Clause having some significant meaning and the Court’s jurisprudence on
the clause which deprived the clause of almost all significance.105

97

Id.
Id.
99
See Sveen v. Melin, 138 S.Ct. 1821, 1828 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (2018).
100
431 U.S. 1, 1–14 (1977).
101
Id. at 15.
102
Id. at 15–16.
103
Id. at 16.
104
Id.
105
Id. at 27 (The Court referenced its holdings in Fletcher and Dartmouth College, both early 19th century cases that
held the Contract Clause was a complete bar on state laws involving contracts. The Court then immediately stated
that the State must have the ability to pass and remove laws that could involve contracts. The contradiction of the
original and modern jurisprudence presented a challenge for the Court).
98
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The Court began its analysis by analyzing if there was impairment of contract when the Port
Authority Bonds were revoked.106 The Court heavily relied on the finding of the district court,
that the bond values were negatively affected by the State’s action, and held that there was
impairment of the contracts.107 The Court then, in line with its jurisprudence of the Contract
Clause, did not automatically strike down the law but evaluated the impairment to determine if it
was permissible.108
The Court held that impairment is permissible if it is “reasonable and necessary to serve an
important public purpose.”109 The Court noted that this was the standard for both public and
private contracts but that when evaluating impairment of private contracts the state legislative
should be given complete deference over what is “reasonable and necessary”.110 The justification
for the disparity in treatment given by the Court was that a “governmental entity can always find
a use for extra money”.111
The Court set out two prongs of consideration to determine what satisfied the “necessary”
element.112 The two considerations the Court put forward were: (1) considering if modification of
the contract was essential; and, (2) was there a less intrusive way to modify the contract that could
have accomplished the same goal.113 When paired with the requirement that the purpose the law
had to be an “important and legitimate public concern,” this standard amounted to a high bar,
similar to strict scrutiny.114 The Court’s holding represented a major change of course from the

106

U.S. Tr. Co. of New York, 431 U.S. at 17.
Id. at 20.
108
Id. (The Court reaffirmed the view put forward in Blaisdell that even though the Contract Clause plainly reads as
a prohibition upon state laws impairing contracts, the clause is not absolute and should not be applied like a
mathematical formula); see Home Building & Loan Assoc. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 428 (1934).
109
U.S. Tr. Co. of New York, 431 U.S. at 25.
110
Id. at 26.
111
Id.
112
Id. at 29–30.
113
Id.
114
Id. at 28.
107
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Contract Clause jurisprudence applied by the Court in Simmons.115 The holding reaffirmed the
belief that the Contract Clause served as some form of a check upon the states, even if it was
limited to only laws that impaired the obligations of public contracts.116
Less than a year later, the Court heard Allied Structural Steel Company v. Spannaus, a
challenge to the constitutionality of a retroactive Minnesota law that changed certain terms of
private pensions.117 The Court began its holding by stating that the Contract Clause reads
“unambiguously absolute” and as a complete bar to any retroactive contract impairment, but that
the jurisprudence of the Contract Clause has not held the clause to be so broad since the early 19th
century.118 But, the Court also opined that the Contract Clause is “not a dead letter.”119
The Court’s holding first measured the degree of impairment the law created, stating that if the
impairment was minimal, the inquiry ended there, but if it was substantial, the law required careful
examination.120 The Court opined that when measuring the impairment a state law created, it was
important to factor in the “high value the Framers placed on the protection of private contracts.”121
The Court held the Minnesota law severely impaired the contracts.122 The Court applied the
test in United States Trust Company of New York which required the law to have been passed to
“meet an important general social problem.”123 The Court held the Minnesota law was not passed
to address any general social problem and therefor was evaluated in same manner as if the law

115

Compare U.S. Tr. Co. of New York, 431 U.S. at 28 with El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497 (1965).
U.S. Tr. Co. of New York v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 16 (1977).
117
438 U.S. 234, 236 (1978).
118
Spannaus, 438 U.S. at 240.
119
Id. at 241.
120
Id. at 244.
121
Id.
122
Id. at 247.
123
Id.; see U.S. Tr. Co. of New York v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 16 (1977).
116
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impaired a public contract with no deference was given to the legislature.124 Without deference to
the legislature, the law was struck down as unconstitutional.125
E. Somewhere in the Middle, Reversal of the Contract Clause Jurisprudence, Again
The Contract Clause came up in a number of cases before the Supreme Court near the end of
the 20th century. In the 1982 case of Texaco, Inc. v. Short, the Court dismissed a challenge to a
mining law in a single paragraph, holding that state laws passed before a contract was entered into
were immune from Contract Clause challenges and, even if they were not, having to record a
document in a county recording office was such a minimal burden that it was “not beyond the
scope of permissible state action.”126
A year later, the Court heard a similar case that involved a Kansas law which regulated private
contracts for the sale and purchase of natural gas in the matter of Energy Reserves Group v. Kansas
Power & Light Company.127 The Court acknowledged its holdings in Blaisdell, US Trust and
Allied Steel, and laid out a test to determine the validity of Contract Clause challenges very similar
to the test found in Allied Steel.128 The first step required the Court to examine the state law to
determine if it substantially impaired the contract in question.129
The Court undertook the first step and held that the Kansas law did not amount to a substantial
impairment because it did not impair the reasonable expectations of the parties to the contract.130
The Court held the natural gas market was highly regulated and that the contract in question
recognized that explicitly.131 Additionally, the Court held that “[t]here can be little doubt about
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the legitimate public purpose behind the Act.”132 Lastly, the Court held that the law was reasonable
in its pursuit of the legitimate public purpose.133 The Court’s decision to uphold the law, utilizing
a test similar to the tests found in US Trust and Allied Steel, showed that state laws could still
survive Constitutional challenges even under the slightly revived Contract Clause.134
In 1983, the Court heard Exxon Corporation v. Eagerton, a Contract Clause challenge to an
Alabama law that retroactively stopped pass-through agreements on taxes for oil and gas sold,
even if they were explicitly agreed to as part of previously executed sales contracts.135 The Court’s
holding began with recited dicta from its holdings in both Stone and Blaisdell that laws “even
barring altogether, the performance of duties created by contracts” could be constitutional.136 The
Court held that the purpose of the Alabama law was to lower the cost of oil and gas for all
consumers and that the law was to be expected given previous rulings of the Court involving oil
and gas laws.137 The Court concluded the Alabama law did not violate the Constitution.138
Notably, the Court did not present an argument that, or even conclusively state, the law was
reasonable or necessary.139
In Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis, the Court held a state law that
retroactively stripped liability waiver clauses from mining contracts was constitutional.140 While
the Court held that the law created a substantial impairment of contracts, that holding did not help
the petitioners.141 It did not help because the Court again held that when reviewing a state law that
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impairs a private contract, the Court is to give the legislature great deference.142 The Court gives
the legislature deference by essentially applying a rational basis standard which means that private
contracts can almost never win a challenge to state law under the Contract Clause.143
Unsurprisingly, once the deference was given to the legislature, the Court held the state law was
constitutional.144
The next important Contract Clause the case the Court heard was General Motors Corporation
v. Romein, a challenge by General Motors and Ford Motor Company to a Michigan statute passed
in 1987 that repealed a 1981 statute.145 In Ford, the Court held that there were three steps to
determine if there was substantial impairment of a contract by state law: (1) was there a contractual
relationship; (2) did the law impair the contractual relationship; and, (3) was the impairment
substantial.146
Uniquely, the car companies in Ford argued that the 1981 statute had been integrated into the
contract by default of the fact that the law was in effect when the contracts were executed.147 They
argued that since the 1987 statute repealed the 1981 statue, and the 1981 statute was integrated
into the contracts, the 1987 statute impaired the contracts by eliminating the effects of the 1981
statute from the contracts.148 The Court rejected the argument, holding that not all state regulations
that existed at the time the contracts were executed were incorporated into the contracts.149 The
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Court held the only laws that were incorporated into the contracts were those that “affect[ed] the
validity, construction and enforcement” of the contracts.150 The Court held that the 1981 statute
was never a part of the contracts meaning that the contracts were not impaired by the 1987
repeal.151
F. Insurance Contracts and the Contact Clause
A touchstone case of Contract Clause jurisprudence, W. B. Worthen Company v. Thomas is
one of the only pure Contract Clauses cases to appear before the Supreme Court dealing with
insurance policies impaired by a state law.152 Decided the same year as Blaisdell, the Court in W.
B. Worthen heard a challenge to an Arkansas law that denied creditors of an individual the ability
to claim a portion of the individual’s life insurance payout.153 The Court referenced its holding in
Blaisdell and struck down the law as unconstitutional, differentiating the law in Blaisdell and the
law in question.154 Specifically, the Court focused on the fact that the Arkansas law was unlimited
in its time of applicability and was not passed to address an emergency.155
Outside of the Supreme Court of the United States, the Eighth and Tenth Circuits have also
addressed Contract Clause challenges to laws that affected insurance policies brought under the
Contract Clause.156 In 1991, the Eighth Circuit heard Whirlpool Corp. v. Ritter, a case with facts
nearly identical to that of Sveen.157 The court held that the law’s retroactive change of the life
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insurance beneficiary after a divorce was “not insignificant.”158 The court opined that “one of the
primary purposes of a life insurance contract is to provide for the financial needs of a person (or
persons) designated by the insured” and that the law “effected a fundamental and pejorative change
in the very essence of these contracts.”159
Having found substantial impairment, the court in Ritter cited to both US Trust and Allied Steel
and held that the law in question was “merely general, social legislation” and therefore must be
examined to determine if it was reasonable.160 The court held that the law was not reasonable
because it was being implemented retroactively to pursue what may or may not have been the
insured’s actual intention.161 The court dismissed the argument that the ease of changing the
beneficiary back should factor into the constitutionality of the law.162
The holding in Ritter did not play a large role Sveen because of the Tenth Circuit’s holding in
Stillman v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n Coll. Ret. Equities Fundi in 2003.163 The facts in
Stillman strongly resemble the facts of both Sveen and Ritter with the only major difference being
that the matter involved annuities and not life insurance.164 In Stillman, the court went out of its
way to strike down the Contract Clause challenge and reject the holding in Ritter.165 The Stillman
court held that there was no substantial impairment of a contractual right.166 Quoting extensively
from the Joint Editorial Board of the Uniform Probate Code, the court held that contracts such as
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the one in question are a “mixture of contract and donative transfer.”167 The court opined that the
paying of the policy to a specified person was purely donative and therefore was not protected by
the Contract Clause.168
Having concluded that the Contract Clause was not applicable, the court went no further in its
analysis.169

The court’s holding in Stillman never discussed if the law was reasonable or

necessary.170 The Court in Sveen also heard the argument that life insurance contracts should be
viewed as having a donative component that is separate from the contractaul component of a life
insurance policy.171 The Court’s consideration of the argument suggests that it may have merit
and may reappear in future Contract Clause cases.172
III. The Supreme Court’s Holding in Sveen v. Melin
Few observers were surprised when the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the matter of Sveen
v. Melin in 2018. While the case focused on Minnesota State Law § 524.2-804, subd. 1, at the
time of certification, at least 26 other states had enacted similar laws.173 Additionally, the interest
the Joint Editorial Board of the Uniform Probate Code showed in Stillman may have caught the
attention of the Court.174 Regardless of the reason, the Court heard the case on March 19, 2018,
and on June 11, 2018, the Supreme Court issued its holding in an opinion written by Justice
Kagan.175
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The majority set out by citing the Court’s holdings in Keystone and Allied Steel to reaffirm the
Court’s long-standing precedent that the Contract Clause applies to all contracts.176 The Court
then cited its holding in Simmons to reaffirm that not all laws “affecting pre-existing contracts
violate the [Contract] Clause.”177 After which, the Court set out the factors that should be
considered in determining if there was a substantial impairment of a contract.178 The Court held
that “the extent to which the law undermines the contractual bargain, interferes with a party’s
reasonable expectations, and prevents the party from safeguarding or reinstating his rights” should
be considered in the analysis.179
Having laid out the considerations, the Court held that Minnesota statute did not substantiality
impair the life insurance contract.180 The Court reached this conclusion by holding that in many
instances the law fulfills the intention of the insured, or at least the legislature thought so.181 An
example of how the Court in Sveen showed great deference to the Minnesota legislature.182 The
Court also stated that the insurance policy was essentially a will substitute and that the law has
long allowed the revoking and altering of previously executed wills.183 The Court went on to opine
that the law “no doubt” changed the contracts but that it was not impairing the contracts because
many policyholders likely welcomed the change.184
Shifting gears, the Court held that the law was unlikely to upset an insured’s expectations at
the time they executed the policy.185 The Court opined that because at the time of execution, a
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reasonable insured individual should have known that a divorce decree could affect the insurance
policy, that the respondent should have expected the outcome the law demands or at least
understood the possibility of it.186 The majority acknowledged that the Contract Clause applies
only to legislation, but dismissed the acknowledgment as irrelevant because it did not alter the
insured’s expectations.187 The Court noted it was unlikely that any married person purchasing life
insurance contemplates divorce anyway.188
The final reasoning presented by the majority for why there was no substantial impairment in
Sveen was the ease at which an insured person could reverse the operations of the law.189 The
Court pointed out that mailing in a change of beneficiary form was all that was required to have
the divorced individual renamed as the beneficiary under the law.190 To support the holding, the
Court cited to its holdings in Jackson, Curtis, Gilfillan, and Vance as examples of the Court
upholding statutes in part because of the ease of compliance with the laws.191 The Court also
repeated the argument made by the petitioners that the result of non-compliance with the
Minnesota law was minimal when compared to the result of non-compliance with the laws in those
cases.192
The majority concluded its holding by dismissing the last point of the respondent’s
argument.193 The Court rejected the argument that recording statutes do not act on the contract
itself, while the Minnesota law acts on a contract by changing a term of the contract.194 The Court
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summarized this as arguing for a separation between rights and remedies of contracts.195 The Court
rejected this argument in part because it found that the recording statutes also act on the contracts,
inserting mandatory action not found in the contract, and in part because both require little effort
to “safeguard those benefits by taking an action.”196 To further bolster this conclusion, the Court
also cited to its holding in Texaco.197 The Court pointed out that in Texaco, the Court specifically
held that there was no legal significance between eliminating a right and a remedy under the
Contract Clause.198
Having reached the above conclusions, seven justices, along with Justice Kagan, held in favor
of Mr. Sveen’s children, holding that the Minnesota law was constitutional because it did not
substantially impair the insurance contract.199
IV. Justice Gorsuch, the Lone Dissenter
Justice Gorsuch wrote the lone dissent in Sveen v. Melin.200 The dissent started out by
conceding that there is no dispute that when applied prospectively the Minnesota law is
Constitutional.201 Then, the dissent continued its argument by examining the wording of the
Contract Clause.202 Justice Gorsuch argued first that the wording of the Contract Clause is
unambiguous and that it demands a complete ban on all state laws that impair the obligations of
contracts.203 Noting, that the framers knew how to write the clause if they did not want it to result
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in a complete bar.204 To buttress this view, the justice cited to the Court’s holding in Sturges.205
Additionally, the justice, pointed to evidence from the ratification of the Constitution to support
the contention that the Contract Clause was intended to be a complete bar and was known to be so
at the time of ratification.206
The dissent then proceeded to highlight the early precedent of the Court that addressed the
Contract Clause and how it aligned with the unambiguous text of the Contract Clause.207 Justice
Gorsuch identified the Court’s holdings in Green, Saunders, and more recently, the dissent of
Justice Black in Simmons to support his view.208 Each case held, in the opinion of the dissent, that
the modern interpretation of the Contract Clause is “hard to square with the Constitution’s original
public meaning.”209
The dissent also addressed the majority’s holding that the Minnesota law did not impair the
life insurance contract.210 Justice Gorsuch began by agreeing with the majority that the choice of
beneficiary is the “whole point” of a life insurance contract.211 The justice, however, argued that
if the “whole point” of the contract was changed by state law, then there must be substantial
impairment.212

The dissent cited to the Court’s holding in Woodward as support for this

premise.213
Attacking the legitimate purpose of the Minnesota law, Justice Gorsuch cited to an amicus
brief filed in Hillman v. Maretta, on behalf of the United States Government, that argued that some
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divorced persons intentionally keep their former spouses as the beneficiary for a variety of
reasons.214 He also cited to other sources that suggest there are benefits to be gained by keeping a
divorced spouse as the beneficiary when children are involved or when a person wishes matters to
be handled more privately than a divorce proceeding.215
With regard to the reasonableness of the impairment, the dissent started out by citing to the
Court’s holdings in Allied Steel and US Trust to lay out the modern Contract Clause
jurisprudence.216

Interestingly, and without comment as to why, Justice Gorsuch defined

reasonableness as requiring that there was no more moderate way to accomplish the legislative
intent, a standard similar to strict scrutiny and only found in modern Contract Clause jurisprudence
when the state was a party to the contract being impaired.217 Perhaps Justice Gorsuch was
accepting the argument put forth by the respondent that the Court should treat public and private
contracts alike when applying the Contract Clause.218
The justice then applied his version of the Allied Steel test to the facts and argued there was a
substantial impairment of the life insurance contract.219 The justice found that not only were there
theoretically less intrusive ways to accomplish the goal but that in some states the theoretical
approaches had become reality.220 Justice Gorsuch also cited to the Amici Curiae for the Women’s
Law Project et al. filed in Sveen v. Melin for support of this contention.221
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The dissent then shifted gears to focus on the arguments made by the majority.222 Justice
Gorsuch alleged that the majority was guilty of putting the carriage before the horse by considering
factors of the reasonableness of the impairment to argue that there was no substantial
impairment.223 The argument rests on the premise that the ease of reversing the effect of the law
should not be considered as part of the standard for determining if there was substantial impairment
created by the law.224 Additionally, the justice argued that the majority glossed over the “sizable
(and maybe growing)” number of people affected by the law and who are not in favor of its
result.225 Justice Gorsuch argued that part of the purpose of the Contract Clause was to protect all
people who enter into contracts and that the majority betrayed that protection.226
Accusing the majority of circular reasoning, the justice also took issue with the majority’s
reasoning for why the law was reasonable.227 The dissent pointed out that the majority agreed with
the Minnesota legislature that the law was necessary because the average insured person pays little
attention to their beneficiary designation after getting divorced.228 The dissent also pointed out
that the majority agreed with the petitioner that the insured individuals can reverse the effects of
the law by paying attention to their beneficiary designation after getting divorced.229 Justice
Gorsuch summarized this argument as “an apparent paradox.”230
Concerning the reasonable expectations argument made by the majority, the dissent took issue
with what he defined as treating courts and legislatures the same.231 The justice argued that a
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major difference between courts and legislatures was that “[c]ourts may apply pre-existing laws”
(emphasis his) while the legislatures passes new laws.232 The justice pointed to criminal law to
provide the example that a court can only punish a person for violating a law that existed at the
time it was broken and that legislatures can only pass laws that make future conduct illegal233 —
a constitutional mandate found in the same article, section, and clause as the Contract Clause.234
Lastly, the dissent challenged the majority’s interpretation of the cases the majority relied on
to establish that retroactive laws have long been found constitutional by the Court.235 Justice
Gorsuch charged that the Court’s holding in Blaisdell only supports retroactive legislation which
alters “contractual remedies” (emphasis his).236 Therefore, the dissent argued, the case was
inapplicable because the Minnesota law changes the obligation of who gets paid – not a remedy of
how to enforce the payment.237 Justice Gorsuch again cited to the Court’s holding in Fletcher and
Justice Black’s dissent Simmons to support his argument.238
Justice Gorsuch also cited Lamphire, arguing that the recording statue the Court upheld did not
affect an obligation but a remedy.239 The justice argued that while the law in Lamphire did prevent
the first owner, who did not record his deed, from obtaining the rights to the land from the second
owner, who did record his deed, nothing in the law prevented the first owner from bringing a claim
against the person who sold the land twice to enforce the obligation.240 Therefor the value of the
contract was never impaired by the law, just how the contract was enforced.241 The justice
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concluded this line of reasoning by distinguishing Gilfillan because of its extraordinary
circumstances.242
Justice Gorsuch concluded his dissent by acknowledging that declaring state laws
unconstitutional is a strong power and should not be lightly invoked.243 But even acknowledging
that, he felt that the Minnesota law could not “survive an encounter even with the breeziest of
Contract Clause tests.”244
V.

Words Have Meanings, Clauses Have Power, and Why the Holding in Sveen v. Melin Missed
the Mark
The Court’s holding in Sveen v. Melin was wrong for a number of reasons, all of which stem

from how the modern Contract Clause jurisprudence has been stripped of almost all power and
meaning. The Contract Clause, which the Court has continually held to be unambiguous,245 and
which the Court originally enforced as such,246 has now evolved into a moderate check on the
states in some cases and dead letter law in others.247 It is time to embrace the dissents of Justice
Sutherland in Blaisdell, Justice Black in Simmons and Justice Gorsuch in Sveen and return the
Contract Clause to at least some of its original purpose.248
A. The Status of the Contract Clause post Sveen v. Melin
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The modern jurisprudence of the Contract Clause was reaffirmed by the Court’s holding in
Sveen, at least for private contracts.249 The Court’s application of the Contract Clause made clear
that challenges brought under the Contract Clause face a steep uphill battle just to prove substantial
impairment.250 The Court held that the reasonable expectations of the parties to the contract, the
purpose of the legislation that changed the contract, and the ease at which the change created by
the law was reversible determined if the law substantially impaired the contract.251 The Court did
not clarify if all three of the elements, or just one or two of them, was required for a law to have
created a substantial impairment.252 The holding in Sveen also raised the bar satisfy any of the
three elements, adding to the battles a challenger of the law faces.253
In Sveen, the Court held that when examining a law to determine if it upset the reasonable
expectations of the parties to the contract, the Court is to examine all laws in existence at the time
of execution of the contract,254 the level of regulation in the field in which the contract existed at
the time of execution,255 the powers courts had with respect to the contract at the time of the
contract’s execution.256 The addition of the consideration of courts powers over the contract, at
the time the contract was executed, makes this element nearly impossible for a challenger to
satisfy.257
The element that examines the purpose of the law that changed the contract is also unlikely
to be satisfied by a challenger. The Court reaffirmed in Sveen that great deference is given to

249

Sveen v. Melin, 138 S.Ct. 1821 (2018).
Id.
251
Id. at 1822.
252
Id. at 1821.
253
Id.
254
Id. at 1823.
255
Sveen, 138 S.Ct. at 1830.
256
Id.
257
Id. (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
250

29

legislatures when evaluating a law that may impair private contracts.258 The practical effect of
deference being given to the legislature, is to remove this element from the reach of a challenger.
For example, in Sveen, evidence that some portion of divorced spouses opposed the effect of the
law was not enough to overcome the Court’s deference to the legislature.259
The third and final element that the Court used to determine if the law substantially
impaired the insurance contract was how easily the effect of the law could be reversed by Mr.
Sveen if he was disgruntled with its effect.260 As Justice Gorsuch argued in his dissent, the Court
held that a law passed after the execution of a contract, that was passed because people did not pay
attention to their life insurance policies was easily reversible because a person can pay attention to
their life insurance policy and reverse the effect of the law.261 The Court essentially held as long
as law’s effects are easily reversible on paper, the Court will uphold the law regardless of the
reality of the situation.262 And of course, even if a challenger satisfied this, or all three elements
laid out by the Court in Sveen, if the law was passed at a time of emergency and is designed to be
short term and to counter the emergency then the law may still stand.263
The modern jurisprudence of the Contract Clause for public contracts is very different than
that for private contracts264 despite the fact that the Contract Clause itself makes no distinction
between the two.265 Two significant differences between how public and private contracts are
treated is: (1) that no deference is given to the state legislature when it impairs a public contract;
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and, (2) state laws that create substantial impairment of public contracts must survive a test that
strongly resembles strict scrutiny instead of rational basis.266 So while the two tests may appear
identical, in reality they are worlds apart with public contracts receiving substantially more
protection than private contracts.
B. The Problems with Modern Contract Clause Jurisprudence
When approaching a constitutional clause, and its jurisprudence, the first step is to
determine the methodology that will be used to interpret the clause.267 There is substantial
disagreement in law and academia over the proper way to interpret the Constitution.268 On one
side, there are textualist and originalist who believe that the Constitution is a dead document and
only consider the text of the Constitution and how it was understood at the time of its ratification.269
On the other side there are those who believe the Constitution is a living document that other
evidence should be considered besides the text and original meaning of the Constitution.270 What
makes the modern jurisprudence of the Contract Clause concerning is that regardless of which
view is used, the modern jurisprudence falls short of what the clause demands.
i. The Textualist and Originalist Approach to the Contract Clause
Textualists interpret the Constitution by examining only what is written in the Constitution
and how the words in the Constitution were defined at the time it was written.271 Somewhat
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similarly, originalist require the constitution be interpreted to mean what it was believed to have
meant by those who ratified it.272 It is clear why these two theories often work hand in hand; the
meaning of the words written, at the time they were written, likely molded what the people who
voted to ratify the Constitution thought the clauses of the Constitution meant.273
The first problem this methodology of constitution interpretation has with modern Contract
Clause jurisprudence is that it is far removed from the original meaning and purpose of the Contract
Clause.274 The Contract Clause, in its eleven short words, describes a bar on state laws which
impair contracts.275 The early history of the ratification of the Contract Clause supports this view
of the clause.276 Evidence from the constitutional debates about the Contract Clause, the similarity
of the Contract Clause to that of an Ordinance in the Articles of Confederation, and the writings
of Madison in The Federalist Number 44, make clear that the drafting committee was not intending
to strongly limit the reach or scope of the clause.277
Likewise, the early jurisprudence of the Contract Clause supports this understanding of the
original intention of the clause.278 Fletcher, Woodward, Sturges, and Green are all early Supreme
Court cases that held that the original understanding of the Contract Clause was to act as a complete
ban on states impairing the obligations of contracts.279 It is telling that in the first case to truly
limit the Court’s understanding of the application of the Contract Clause, Saunders, the Court held

272

See generally Originalism and Textualism, supra note 271, at 755.
Id.
274
See Original Understandings, supra note 13, at 533 (“Thus, the history of the [Contract] [c]lause suggests that it
was aimed at all retrospective . . . scheme in violation of vested contractual rights”); but see Sveen v. Melin, 138 S.Ct.
1821 (2018) (The Court held a retroactive state law was constitutional).
275
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
276
See Original Understanding, supra note 13, at 533.
277
Id. at 530–33.
278
See Contract Clause and the Court, supra note 21, at 124–26.
279
Id.
273

32

that it was unsure of the ruling it was issuing and only restricted the clause to be applicable to laws
that retroactively impair contracts.280
ii. The Non-Textualist and Non-Originalist approach to the Contract Clause
Even to those who dismiss, or who place less value on, the importance of interpreting the
Constitution in a textualist or originalist fashion, there is little debate that the words of the
Constitution must mean something.281

The non-textualist and non-originalist approach to

constitutional interpretation considers multiple factors including the text, original meaning,
legislative intent, modern understanding of the constitution and the effect of the Courts holding on
the matter to form the meaning of the Constitution.282 Interpretation of the Constitution, when not
done in originalist or textualist fashion, can require looking at the intent of words and applying it
to modern times.283
The purpose of the Contract Clause was to stop states from passing laws that impair
contracts, particularly in a manner that allows a government to disfavor the contracts of a private
citizens, and to allow the economy to function with the security of valid contracts.284 As explained
in Part II, the purpose is known by the debates about the Contract Clause that lead to its insertion
and eventual ratification as part of the United States Constitution.285 The concerns that lead to the
inclusion of the Contract Clause in the Constitution are still very applicable today.
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Protecting citizens from state government agendas that may disfavor them is still a very
sought after goal,286 as is passing laws that allow the economy to function properly and for people
to be able to trust in the validity and enforceability of their contracts in business.287 It follows that
even if the Contract Clause is not to be construed absolutely, it should be interpreted as a clause to
protect disfavored individuals from having states pass laws impairing the contracts they entered
into before the law was passed except in exceptional cases.288
It worth pausing to consider groups that contract within states and who benefit from the
Constitution’s protection from the states being able to impair their contracts. There is no dispute
that some states pass laws with the intention of making it harder for unions to operate.289 Unions
are a prime example of a group who may be disfavored by the state government290 and who may
benefit from their contracts being protected against state laws. It does not take a vivid imagination
to contemplate a scenarios where states that disfavor unions could take advantage of the ability to
impair contracts unions enter into after the contracts are executed. Unions are just one example of
a potentially disfavored group that benefits from the Contract Clause’s purpose of protecting
contracts from state impairment.
When applying this approach of constitutional interpretation to the Contract Clause, the
modern jurisprudence of the Contract Clause comes up short. As the Court’s holding in Sveen
made clear, and Justice Gorsuch criticized in his dissent, the modern Contract Clause jurisprudence

286

Sveen v. Melin, 138 S. Ct. 1821, 1829–30 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (2018).
Take for example, the fact that in 2016, 27.5 million life insurance contracts were purchased. These contracts are
only entered into because they are believed to be binding and enforceable by the terms they contain. Number of life
insurance policy purchases in the United States from 1998 to 2017 (in millions), STATISTA,
https://www.statista.com/statistics/194363/us-life-insurance-policy-purchases-total-since-1999/.
288
Sveen, 138 S. Ct. at 1829–30 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (2018).
289
See J. Albert Woll, State Anti Union Security Laws - A Tragic Fraud, 15 Fed. B.J. 68, 75 (1955) (discussing states
that have passed “right to work” laws and how they are part of a national attempt to hurt unions).
290
Id.
287

34

favors laws that are favored by the state.291 Put a different way, the modern jurisprudence allows
the majority in a state, through its legislature, to pass laws that impair the contracts of disfavored
or less cared about individuals.292 In the case of Sveen, to impair the contracts of those who divorce
amicably, or at least in a fashion where one spouse still wishes to provide for the other in the case
of their passing.293
Along with losing its purpose of protecting disfavored individual’s contracts, the modern
jurisprudence is ignoring the equally valid economic protection purpose of the Contract Clause.294
It is undisputed that contracts are an important element of the modern economy.295 But contracts
are only useful when the terms written in them are believed to be enforceable and governing the
exchange.296 The value of a contract is greatly diminished if at any time and for any “good” reason
a state can pass a law that changes the terms of the contract. While it is generally conceded that
sometimes this practice of altering contracts by state law must be allowed, particularly when done
to stop actions considered criminal or dangerous, at other times it is something that must be
avoided to provide stability and faith to the market.297 The modern jurisprudence of the Contract
Clause invites states to interfere with private contracts at their own leisure.298 As the Court pointed
out in United States Trust Company of New York v. New Jersey, a “governmental entity can always
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find a use for extra money”.299 The risk of states impairing contracts with immunity concerned
the framers of the Constitution and should equally concern the Court now.300
Lastly, the treatment of the Contract Clause by the Court sets the precedent that full clauses
of the Constitution can be ignored by the Court, or at the least, chipped away until they mean next
to nothing.301 This is a precedent that should equally concern all citizens, regardless of their
favored manner of interpreting the Constitution.302 While ignoring the Contract Clause is unlikely
to provoke outrage from the general public, or even from most in the legal community, it is a
dangerous precedent no less.303
VI. Be Part of the Solution, Not the Problem; Fixing the Contract Clause Jurisprudence
While it may seem tempting to return the Contract Clause to its original meaning, doing so
would be equally unlikely and disastrous, even if proper. Consider the number of state laws
currently in existence. Now consider how many of them impair some form of contract in one way
or another. While no exact answer can be given, it is safe to assume the answer is a lot. If
tomorrow, all of these laws’ constitutionality was questioned, the impact would be both large and
negative. This is essentially the argument made for stare decisis, to avoid overnight reversals of
laws that create drastic changes by the courts.304 Instead, the Court should follow the suggestion
of the respondent and the implication of Justice Gorsuch’s dissent, and change the standard of
judging private contracts challenged under the Contract Clause to match the standard of judging
public contracts challenged under the Contract Clause.305

299

United States Trust Company of New York v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 26 (1977).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 44 (James Madison).
301
Sveen v. Melin, 138 S. Ct. 1821, 1829 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (2018).
302
Harry Steinberg, Stare Decisis Provides Stability to the Legal System, but Applying May Involve a Love-Hate
Relationship, 73 N.Y. ST. B.A. J. 39, 43 (2001) [hereinafter Stare Decisis].
303
Id.
304
See supra Stare Decisis, note 302 at 39, 43.
305
Sveen v. Melin, 138 S. Ct. 1821, 1829 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (2018).
300

36

The modern jurisprudence of the Contract Clause for challenges to state laws that impair
public contracts is measurably stricter then challenges to private contracts.306 It eliminates the
deference given to the state and requires the state to consider alternatives to impairing contracts
when possible.307 The change would help realign the modern jurisprudence of the Contracts
Clause with its original purpose.308 By losing the required deference standard, the courts would
examine laws to see if they are passed by states to unfairly target certain private citizens, as
originally intended.309 Similarly, the Court would also be able to examine state laws to be sure
that they are not impairing citizen’s faith in their contracts as the Framers feared would occur.310
And, perhaps most importantly, it would continue to give the Contract Clause actual meaning and
not be essentially written out of the Constitution.
The change would bring the modern Contract Clause back towards its original intent. The
Contract Clause was meant to favor the challengers of state laws, not to make state laws
unquestionable.311 The modern jurisprudence pushes the high burden onto the challenger except
in cases involving public contracts.312 If the Contract Clause is applied to private contracts as if
they were public contracts, the Contract Clause would retain its use as a bar on the states except
when laws are truly necessary for emergent reasons, limiting Blaisdell as Justice Black argued in
his dissent in Simmons.313
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The same can be said of how the shift would align more with a textual analysis of the
Contract Clause. The text of the Contract Clause is clear, states must not pass laws that impair
contracts.314 Any interpretation that makes it harder for the state to pass these law is a step towards
alignment with the text.315 It would also eliminate the distinction the Court created between private
and public contracts, a distinction that has no support in the text.316
Non-originalist and non-textualist methodologies of interpreting the Constitution will also
find this shift in the application of the Contract Clause desirable. By applying the modern public
standard to private contracts, there would still be nothing preventing states from passing laws that
impair contracts in times of emergency.317 What would be prevented is states passing laws that
retroactively change contracts for any reason other than serious need.318 This interpretation
protects contracts that may become disfavored by a state for any reason and the economy. What
this interpretation does not do is stop states from passing laws that are necessary to protect a state
or its citizens.319
Interpretations of the Constitution almost always disfavors absolutes.320 In fact, the Court’s
precedents in freedom of speech cases make clear that no right is absolute, regardless of what a
textualist, originalist, or any other interpretative methodology may find the right to demand.321
Treating all laws challenged under the Contract Clause as if they are impairing public contract is
a realistic approach because it protects disfavored groups within a state, protects the economies
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faith in contracts, and protects the legitimacy of all clauses in the Constitution, without imposing
an absolute bar that the court’s avoid.322
While perhaps not ideal for any one methodology of constitutional interpretation, the
proposed interpretation of the Contract Clause represents a modest approach to realigning the
jurisprudence of the clause with it original purpose while remaining workable in modern times. It
strikes a position in the middle of the extremes of the Court’s holdings in Fletcher and Simmons.323
By taking this modest approach at reforming the jurisprudence, the proposed interpretation
presents a realistic opportunity to implement an interpretation of the Contract Clause that most can
accept.
VII. Stare Excusis324* and the Argument Against Changing the Contract Clause
The strongest argument against the proposed interpretation of the Contract Clause is stare
decisis. Stare decisis is a legal theory that the Supreme Court should abide by its earlier
decisions.325

The purpose of the theory is to ”promote[] stability, protect[] reliance

interests, constrain[] judicial discretion, and reduce[] the decision costs of resolving constitutional
cases.”326 It is generally agreed upon that stare decisis is an important theory in all methodologies
of constitutional interpretation.327
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The theory of stare decisis argues that the Supreme Court should be extremely hesitant in
changing its current jurisprudence of the Contract Clause.328 It argues that the lower courts, and
all citizens, are depending on the current interpretation of the clause being consistently applied in
cases across the country.329
The argument for stare decisis is less persuasive, however, when viewed in the context of the
history of the Contract Clause. As examined in Part II, the Court’s interpretation of the Contract
Clause has changed multiple times during the last two centuries.330 Every one of these changes
represents an example of the Court straying from the theory of stare decisis.331 Admittedly some
of the changes have been minor, but others have also been large and strongly push against the legal
theory.332
It is also relevant that the current jurisprudence of the Contract Clause is less than a year old.333
The argument of stare decisis strengthens with time, which means it is currently at its weakest
form.334 Admittedly, this rebuttal is weakened because Sveen relied the jurisprudence on the clause
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from the 1970s.335 Even so, the jurisprudence of the clause being relied on is relatively small when
considering the lifespan of the Contract Clause.336
When all of these arguments against the theory of stare decisis are aggregated, they create a
fair rebuttal. Stare Decisis is an important element of this country’s legal framework,337 but it can
also be used as an excuse to avoid necessary change. Reformation of the Contract Clause should
not be prevented because of stare decisis.
Another argument that could be made against the implementation of the proposed
interpretation of the Contract Clause is that will be too restrictive on the states, an argument that
has been made since its inclusion in the Constitution.338 As discussed above, this argument is
unpersuasive because even strict textualist disfavors absolute interpretations of the Constitution.339
The proposed interpretation maintains flexibly because it is not calling for Blaisdell to be overruled
and therefore maintaining the theory that states can impair contracts during emergencies if done
in a reasonable manner.340
Strict Originalist are also likely to take issue with the proposed interpretation not over
Blaisdell.341 The argument is that Contract Clause was known during the ratification period to be
an inconvenience on states, specifically in their ability to respond to emergencies.342 For this
reason they will oppose any interpretation that does not enforce the same strict liability upon the
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states.343 As argued above, while this view may please strict originalist, the Court disfavors
absolutes and it is unlikely to believe they will accept any proposed interpretation that demands an
absolute bar.344 So while the proposed interpretation may not go far enough for a strict originalist,
it is likely their best shot at a step towards their preferred interpretation of the Contract Clause.
The proposed interpretation of the Contract Clause may not be perfect. It may present stare
decisis concerns345 and is unlikely to please any one particular view of constitutional
interpretation.346 The Court should adopt the proposed interpretation of the Contract Clause
anyway because the current status of Contract Clause jurisprudence is unacceptable347, the benefits
of the proposed interpretation warrant the change348, and because stare decisis should not force
bad law to be addressable.
VIII. How the Court Should Have Held in Sveen v. Melin
Had the Court relied on the proposed interpretation of the Contract Clause, its holding in
Sveen would have looked a lot more like the argument of the Justice Gorsuch’s dissent. There are
two major differences that would have taken place in the analysis of the Minnesota law: (1) a shift
in the likelihood of finding an impairment in favor of Ms. Melin; and, (2) the removal of deference
to the Minnesota legislature.
Starting with the shift in finding an impairment, the proposed interpretation would have
required the Court to examine the law under the standard it has applied to public contracts.349 The
Court’s holding in US Trust made clear that the Court favored finding impairments in Contract
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Clause challenges involving public contracts.350 While it is impossible to accurately predict how
the Court would have held, the Court’s history of finding impairments of public contracts and the
fact the Court in Sveen found a “change” of the contract makes it more likely than not that an
impairment would have been found.351
If the Court had found an impairment, it is very likely that the law would have been held
to be unconstitutional under the proposed interpretation. The proposed interpretation would have
required the Court to give no deference to the Minnesota legislature regarding the necessity of the
law.352 More so, the interpretation would have applied a standard similar to strict scrutiny.353 It
would have required the Court to examine if there were less intrusive methods to accomplish its
goal.354 As the dissent by Justice Gorsuch pointed out, there are actually implemented laws that
accomplish the goal of assisting divorced spouses to address their life insurance policies that do
not impair insurance contracts in multiple states.355 The existence of alternatives would have
required the Court to hold that the Minnesota law violated the Contract Clause of the Constitution.
IX. Conclusion
The Supreme Court must reverse the course of its precedent with regards to the Contract Clause
of the United States Constitution. The current jurisprudence of the clause is unsatisfactory
regardless of which method of constitutional interpretation is employed. The ideal solution is to
enforce the Contract Clause against private contracts in the same manner in which the Court
currently enforces it against public contracts. This realignment of the Contract Clause is supported
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by all interpretative methods of the Constitution and likely would have led to a reversal of the
Court’s holding in Sveen v. Melin.
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